Notifiable Data Breaches (NDB) Playbook
| Title | Notifiable Data Breaches (NDB) Playbook |
| Doc# | SOP-PRIV-001 |
| Version | 1.2 |
| Date | 05-03-2025 |
| Owner | Chief Information Security Officer (I. Ferreira) |
| Approved By | Head of Compliance (M. Dubois) |
This playbook governs the assessment of, and response to, suspected eligible data breaches under the Australian Notifiable Data Breaches (NDB) scheme established by Part IIIC of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and administered by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC). It supplements — and for privacy-affected incidents supersedes — the general Breach Investigation and Notification Policy (POL-COMP-006), which retains a legacy HIPAA framing for historical reference only.
NOTE ON FRAMING: Tessera is an Australian entity holding personal information of Australian individuals. The governing regime is the Privacy Act and the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs), not HIPAA. Where POL-COMP-006 still refers to “ePHI”, “HHS” or “45 CFR”, this playbook is authoritative.
1. The NDB scheme in brief
An eligible data breach arises where:
- there is unauthorised access to, unauthorised disclosure of, or loss of, personal information held by Tessera; and
- this is likely to result in serious harm to one or more individuals; and
- Tessera has not been able to prevent the likely risk of serious harm through remedial action.
Where these criteria are met, Tessera must notify the OAIC and, in most cases, the affected individuals, as soon as practicable after becoming aware that there are reasonable grounds to believe an eligible data breach has occurred. The Privacy Act deems an entity to “become aware” via a 30-day presumption, but Tessera operates to a tighter internal target (below).
The “serious harm” test is multi-factorial and considers, among other things: the kind and sensitivity of the information; whether the information is protected (by encryption, for example); the circumstances of the breach; and the nature of the harm (financial, reputational, physical, psychological).
72-HOUR INTERNAL TARGET: Tessera’s internal service standard is to complete the breach assessment within 72 hours of a suspected breach being triaged, and to be in a position to notify the OAIC within that window where the breach is assessed as eligible. This is stricter than the scheme’s outer limits and is set to give Legal and the Executive Risk Committee room to validate the assessment. Note: the Privacy Act itself does not impose a 72-hour notification deadline; the statutory touchstones are “as soon as practicable” and the 30-day awareness presumption.
2. Roles and responsibilities
- Incident lead — CISO (Isabella Ferreira). Owns the response, declares the assessment clock, and is the decision-maker on notifiability recommendations.
- Data Protection Officer (DPO). Advises on APP 11 (security of personal information) obligations, the serious-harm assessment, and individual notification content.
- Legal Counsel. Advises on privilege, regulatory exposure, law-enforcement liaison, and contractual notification obligations to tenants.
- Head of People (Anika Desai). Coordinates internal communications and any workforce-related aspects of the breach.
- Head of Engineering (Noah Bennett) / Cloud Infrastructure (Connor Hayes). Provides forensic and containment support from the platform side.
- Head of Compliance (Margaux Dubois). Owns the breach register entry and the record-keeping for the OAIC.
3. Procedure
- Detect / receive report. Any workforce member who suspects a breach reports it immediately to
security@tessera.locoensayo.orgor via the on-call channel. The CISO triages within 1 business hour. - Triage and assign. The CISO confirms an incident is in scope, opens an entry in the Security Incident Register (DOC-SEC-005), and stands up the response team. The 72-hour assessment clock starts when the incident is triaged.
- Contain. Take immediate steps to stop ongoing unauthorised access or disclosure (revoke credentials, rotate keys, isolate hosts). Containment is documented but does not pause the assessment clock.
- Gather facts. Establish what personal information is involved, how many individuals are affected, the vector, and the window of exposure. Pull evidence from CloudTrail, IdP/session logs and the IAM revocation log.
- Assess serious harm. The DPO and Legal apply the multi-factor serious-harm test and record the reasoning. Where harm is unlikely, document the rationale and close the assessment; where likely, proceed.
- Decide notifiability. The CISO, DPO and Legal jointly confirm whether the breach is eligible and therefore notifiable to the OAIC. The decision and its basis are recorded in the incident register.
- Prepare notification. Draft the OAIC notification (statement of facts, kind of information, recommended steps, contact details) and, where required, individual notifications. Legal reviews for privilege and accuracy.
- Notify. Lodge the notification with the OAIC via the online portal and notify affected individuals by the chosen method (email/website). Record notification timestamps.
- Remediate. Implement corrective actions (e.g. key rotation, access reviews, segmentation fixes) and track them to closure.
- Review. Within 10 business days, conduct a post-incident review; capture lessons and update controls, the SoA (DOC-SEC-003) and this playbook as needed.
4. Worked example — TSR-INC-2025-031
In late February 2025 Tessera detected anomalous data egress from its multi-tenant platform. Investigation established that a long-lived AWS access key had been exposed through a misconfigured public source-code repository and had been used to reach tenant data across an unsegmented path between the management plane and tenant data stores. Approximately 14,000 tenant records were exposed over an estimated five-day window; containment took a further ~48 hours.
- Assessment: the DPO and Legal assessed the exposure as likely to result in serious harm (personal and contact information of identifiable individuals).
- Decision: eligible data breach — notifiable.
- Notification: Tessera notified the OAIC within the 72-hour internal target and notified affected tenants and, through them, affected individuals, consistent with its obligations under Part IIIC.
- Outcome: first-year impact estimated at ~$1.8M; 23 tenants did not renew. The incident was the direct trigger for the ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certification-readiness mandate.
TEACHING NOTE: The speed of OAIC notification in TSR-INC-2025-031 was a compliance strength; the underlying control weaknesses (the long-lived key, the absent segmentation) are tracked separately as corrective actions. Do not treat a fast notification as evidence that the preventive controls were effective.
STALE REFERENCE: Step 4 still lists “SIEM alert” as the primary detection source; for cloud-originated breaches, CloudTrail and GuardDuty are now primary. Update in the next revision.